{"draft":"draft-ietf-msec-bootstrapping-tesla-03","doc_id":"RFC4442","title":"Bootstrapping Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication (TESLA)","authors":["S. Fries","H. Tschofenig"],"format":["ASCII","HTML"],"page_count":"18","pub_status":"PROPOSED STANDARD","status":"PROPOSED STANDARD","source":"Multicast Security","abstract":"TESLA, the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication\r\nprotocol, provides source authentication in multicast scenarios.\r\nTESLA is an efficient protocol with low communication and computation\r\noverhead that scales to large numbers of receivers and also tolerates\r\npacket loss.  TESLA is based on loose time synchronization between\r\nthe sender and the receivers.  Source authentication is realized in\r\nTESLA by using Message Authentication Code (MAC) chaining.  The use\r\nof TESLA within the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) has\r\nbeen published, targeting multicast authentication in scenarios where\r\nSRTP is applied to protect the multimedia data.  This solution\r\nassumes that TESLA parameters are made available by out-of-band\r\nmechanisms.\r\n\r\nThis document specifies payloads for the Multimedia Internet Keying\r\n(MIKEY) protocol for bootstrapping TESLA for source authentication of\r\nsecure group communications using SRTP.  TESLA may be bootstrapped\r\nusing one of the MIKEY key management approaches, e.g., by using a\r\ndigitally signed MIKEY message sent via unicast, multicast, or\r\nbroadcast.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]","pub_date":"March 2006","keywords":["authentication","mikey","multimedia internet keying protocol"],"obsoletes":[],"obsoleted_by":[],"updates":[],"updated_by":[],"see_also":[],"doi":"10.17487\/RFC4442","errata_url":null}