rfc9925.original   rfc9925.txt 
Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME D. Benjamin Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. Benjamin
Internet-Draft Google LLC Request for Comments: 9925 Google LLC
Updates: 5280 (if approved) 5 September 2025 Updates: 5280 February 2026
Intended status: Standards Track Category: Standards Track
Expires: 9 March 2026 ISSN: 2070-1721
Unsigned X.509 Certificates Unsigned X.509 Certificates
draft-ietf-lamps-x509-alg-none-10
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a placeholder X.509 signature algorithm that This document defines a placeholder X.509 signature algorithm that
may be used in contexts where the consumer of the certificate is not may be used in contexts where the consumer of the certificate is not
expected to verify the signature. As part of this, it updates RFC expected to verify the signature. As part of this, it updates RFC
5280. 5280.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at
https://davidben.github.io/x509-alg-none/draft-ietf-lamps-x509-alg-
none.html. Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-x509-alg-none/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Limited Additional
Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME Working Group mailing list
(mailto:spasm@ietf.org), which is archived at
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https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/davidben/x509-alg-none.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on 9 March 2026. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9925.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Requirements Language
3. Constructing Unsigned Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Constructing Unsigned Certificates
3.1. Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Signature
3.2. Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. Issuer
3.3. Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3. Extensions
4. Consuming Unsigned Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Consuming Unsigned Certificates
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. Security Considerations
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. IANA Considerations
6.1. Module Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6.1. Module Identifier
6.2. Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6.2. Algorithm
6.3. Relative Distinguished Name Attribute . . . . . . . . . . 8 6.3. Relative Distinguished Name Attribute
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. References
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7.1. Normative References
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.2. Informative References
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Acknowledgements
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Author's Address
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
An X.509 certificate [RFC5280] relates two entities in the PKI: An X.509 certificate [RFC5280] relates two entities in the PKI:
information about a subject and a proof from an issuer. Viewing the information about a subject and a proof from an issuer. Viewing the
PKI as a graph with entities as nodes, as in [RFC4158], a certificate PKI as a graph with entities as nodes, as in [RFC4158], a certificate
is an edge between the subject and issuer. is an edge between the subject and issuer.
In some contexts, an application needs standalone subject information In some contexts, an application needs standalone subject information
instead of a certificate. In the graph model, the application needs instead of a certificate. In the graph model, the application needs
a node, not an edge. For example, certification path validation a node, not an edge. For example, certification path validation
(Section 6 of [RFC5280]) begins at a trust anchor, or root (Section 6 of [RFC5280]) begins at a trust anchor or root
certification authority (root CA). The application trusts this trust certification authority (root CA). The application trusts this trust
anchor information out-of-band and does not require an issuer's anchor information out-of-band and does not require an issuer's
signature. signature.
X.509 does not define a structure for this scenario. Instead, X.509 X.509 does not define a structure for this scenario. Instead, X.509
trust anchors are often represented with "self-signed" certificates, trust anchors are often represented with "self-signed" certificates,
where the subject's key signs over itself. Other formats, such as where the subject's key signs over itself. Other formats, such as
[RFC5914] exist to convey trust anchors, but self-signed certificates [RFC5914], exist to convey trust anchors, but self-signed
remain widely used. certificates remain widely used.
Additionally, some TLS [RFC8446] server deployments use self-signed Additionally, some TLS [RFC8446] server deployments use self-signed
end entity certificates when they do not intend to present a CA- end entity certificates when they do not intend to present a CA-
issued identity, instead expecting the relying party to authenticate issued identity, instead expecting the relying party to authenticate
the certificate out-of-band, e.g. via a known fingerprint. the certificate out-of-band, e.g., via a known fingerprint.
These self-signatures typically have no security value, aren't These self-signatures typically have no security value, aren't
checked by the receiver, and only serve as placeholders to meet checked by the receiver, and only serve as placeholders to meet
syntactic requirements of an X.509 certificate. syntactic requirements of an X.509 certificate.
Computing signatures as placeholders has some drawbacks: Computing signatures as placeholders has some drawbacks:
* Post-quantum signature algorithms are large, so including a self- * Post-quantum signature algorithms are large, so including a self-
signature significantly increases the size of the payload. signature significantly increases the size of the payload.
* If the subject is an end entity, rather than a CA, computing an * If the subject is an end entity, rather than a CA, computing an
X.509 signature risks cross-protocol attacks with the intended use X.509 signature risks cross-protocol attacks with the intended use
of the key. of the key.
* It is ambiguous whether such a self-signature requires the CA bit * It is ambiguous whether such a self-signature requires the CA bit
in basic constraints or keyCertSign in key usage. If the key is in basic constraints or keyCertSign in key usage. If the key is
intended for a non-X.509 use, asserting those capabilities is an intended for a non-X.509 use, asserting those capabilities is an
unnecessary risk. unnecessary risk.
* If the subject is an end entity, and the end entity's key is not a * If the subject is an end entity, and the end entity's key is not a
signing key (e.g. a KEM key), there is no valid signature signing key (e.g., a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) key), there
algorithm to use with the key. is no valid signature algorithm to use with the key.
This document defines a profile for unsigned X.509 certificates, This document defines a profile for unsigned X.509 certificates,
which may be used when the certificate is used as a container for which may be used when the certificate is used as a container for
subject information, without any specific issuer. subject information, without any specific issuer.
2. Conventions and Definitions 2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
3. Constructing Unsigned Certificates 3. Constructing Unsigned Certificates
This section describes how a sender constructs an unsigned This section describes how a sender constructs an unsigned
certificate. certificate.
3.1. Signature 3.1. Signature
To construct an unsigned X.509 certificate, the sender MUST set the To construct an unsigned X.509 certificate, the sender MUST set the
skipping to change at page 5, line 6 skipping to change at line 166
* issuer (Section 4.1.2.4 of [RFC5280]) * issuer (Section 4.1.2.4 of [RFC5280])
* issuerUniqueID (Section 4.1.2.8 of [RFC5280]) * issuerUniqueID (Section 4.1.2.8 of [RFC5280])
The issuer field is not optional, and both [X.509] and The issuer field is not optional, and both [X.509] and
Section 4.1.2.4 of [RFC5280] forbid empty issuers, so such a value Section 4.1.2.4 of [RFC5280] forbid empty issuers, so such a value
may not be interoperable with existing applications. may not be interoperable with existing applications.
If the subject is not empty, senders MAY set the issuer to the If the subject is not empty, senders MAY set the issuer to the
subject, similar how they would construct a self-signed certificate. subject, similar to how they would construct a self-signed
This may be useful in applications that, for example, expect trust certificate. This may be useful in applications that, for example,
anchors to have matching issuer and subject. This is, however, a expect trust anchors to have a matching issuer and subject. This is,
placeholder value. The unsigned certificate is not considered self- however, a placeholder value. The unsigned certificate is not
signed or self-issued. considered self-signed or self-issued.
Senders MAY alternatively use a short placeholder issuer consisting Senders MAY alternatively use a short placeholder issuer consisting
of a single relative distinguished name, with a single attribute of of a single relative distinguished name, with a single attribute of
type id-rdna-unsigned and value a zero-length UTF8String. id-rdna- type id-rdna-unsigned and value a zero-length UTF8String. id-rdna-
unsigned is defined as follows: unsigned is defined as follows:
id-rdna-unsigned OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 3 6 1 5 5 7 TBD1 TBD2} id-rdna-unsigned OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 3 6 1 5 5 7 25 1}
This placeholder name, in the string representation of [RFC4514], is: This placeholder name, in the string representation of [RFC4514], is:
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.TBD1.TBD2=#0C00 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.25.1=#0C00
Senders MUST omit the issuerUniqueID field, as it is optional, not Senders MUST omit the issuerUniqueID field, as it is optional, not
applicable, and already forbidden by Section 4.1.2.8 of [RFC5280]. applicable, and already forbidden by Section 4.1.2.8 of [RFC5280].
3.3. Extensions 3.3. Extensions
Some X.509 extensions also describe the certificate issuer and thus Some X.509 extensions also describe the certificate issuer and thus
are not meaningful for an unsigned certificate: are not meaningful for an unsigned certificate:
* authority key identifier (Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280]) * authority key identifier (Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280])
* issuer alternative name (Section 4.2.1.7 of [RFC5280]) * issuer alternative name (Section 4.2.1.7 of [RFC5280])
Senders SHOULD omit the authority key identifier and issuer Senders SHOULD omit the authority key identifier and issuer
alternative name extensions. Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280] requires alternative name extensions. Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280] requires
certificates to include the authority key identifier, but includes an certificates to include the authority key identifier, but includes an
exception for self-signed certificates used when distributing a exception for self-signed certificates used when distributing a
public key. This document updates [RFC5280] to also permit omitting public key. This document updates [RFC5280] to also permit omitting
authority key identifier in unsigned certificates. the authority key identifier in unsigned certificates.
Some extensions reflect whether the subject is a CA or an end entity: Some extensions reflect whether the subject is a CA or an end entity:
* key usage (Section 4.2.1.3 of [RFC5280]) * key usage (Section 4.2.1.3 of [RFC5280])
* basic constraints (Section 4.2.1.9 of [RFC5280]) * basic constraints (Section 4.2.1.9 of [RFC5280])
Senders SHOULD fill in these values to reflect the subject. That is: Senders SHOULD fill in these values to reflect the subject. That is:
If the subject is a CA, it SHOULD assert the keyCertSign key usage * If the subject is a CA, it SHOULD assert the keyCertSign key usage
bit and SHOULD include a basic constraints extensions that sets the bit and SHOULD include a basic constraints extension that sets the
cA boolean to TRUE. cA boolean to TRUE.
If the subject is an end entity, it SHOULD NOT assert the keyCertSign * If the subject is an end entity, it SHOULD NOT assert the
key usage bit, and it SHOULD either omit the basic constraints keyCertSign key usage bit, and it SHOULD either omit the basic
extension or set the cA boolean to FALSE. Unlike a self-signed constraints extension or set the cA boolean to FALSE. Unlike a
certificate, an unsigned certificate does not issue itself, so there self-signed certificate, an unsigned certificate does not issue
is no need to accommodate a self-signature in either extension. itself, so there is no need to accommodate a self-signature in
either extension.
4. Consuming Unsigned Certificates 4. Consuming Unsigned Certificates
X.509 signatures of type id-alg-unsigned are always invalid: X.509 signatures of type id-alg-unsigned are always invalid:
* When processing X.509 certificates without verifying signatures, * When processing X.509 certificates without verifying signatures,
receivers MAY accept id-alg-unsigned. receivers MAY accept id-alg-unsigned.
* When verifying X.509 signatures, receivers MUST reject id-alg- * When verifying X.509 signatures, receivers MUST reject id-alg-
unsigned. unsigned.
In particular, X.509 validators MUST NOT accept id-alg-unsigned in In particular, X.509 validators MUST NOT accept id-alg-unsigned in
the place of a signature in the certification path. the place of a signature in the certification path.
It is expected that most unmodified X.509 applications will already It is expected that most unmodified X.509 applications will already
be compliant with this guidance. X.509 applications are thus be compliant with this guidance. X.509 applications are thus
RECOMMENDED to satisfy these requirements by ignoring this document, RECOMMENDED to satisfy these requirements by ignoring this document
and instead treating id-alg-unsigned as the same as an unrecognized and instead treating id-alg-unsigned as the same as an unrecognized
signature algorithm. An unmodified X.509 validator will be unable to signature algorithm. An unmodified X.509 validator will be unable to
verify the signature (Step (a.1) of Section 6.1.3 of [RFC5280]) and verify the signature (Step (a.1) of Section 6.1.3 of [RFC5280]) and
thus reject the certification path. Conversely, in contexts where an thus reject the certification path. Conversely, in contexts where an
X.509 application was ignoring the self-signature, id-alg-unsigned X.509 application was ignoring the self-signature, id-alg-unsigned
will also be ignored, but more efficiently. will also be ignored but more efficiently.
In other contexts, an application may require modifications, or limit In other contexts, an application may require modifications or limit
itself to particular forms of unsigned certificate. For example, an itself to particular forms of unsigned certificates. For example, an
application might check self-signedness to classify locally- application might check self-signedness to classify locally
configured certificates as trust anchors or untrusted intermediates. configured certificates as trust anchors or untrusted intermediates.
Such an application may need to modify its configuration model or Such an application may need to modify its configuration model or
user interface before using an unsigned certificate as a trust user interface before using an unsigned certificate as a trust
anchor. anchor.
5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations
It is best practice to limit cryptographic keys to a single purpose It is best practice to limit cryptographic keys to a single purpose
each. If a key is reused across contexts, applications risk cross- each. If a key is reused across contexts, applications risk cross-
protocol attacks when the two uses collide. However, in applications protocol attacks when the two uses collide. However, in applications
that use self-signed end entity certificates, the subject's key is that use self-signed end entity certificates, the subject's key is
necessarily used in two ways: the X.509 self-signature, and the end necessarily used in two ways: the X.509 self-signature and the end
entity protocol. Unsigned certificates fix this key reuse by entity protocol. Unsigned certificates fix this key reuse by
removing the X.509 self-signature. removing the X.509 self-signature.
If an application accepts id-alg-unsigned as part of a certification If an application accepts id-alg-unsigned as part of a certification
path, or in any other context where it is necessary to verify the path, or in any other context where it is necessary to verify the
X.509 signature, the signature check would be bypassed. Thus, X.509 signature, the signature check would be bypassed. Thus,
Section 4 prohibits this and recommends that applications treat id- Section 4 prohibits this and recommends that applications treat id-
alg-unsigned the same as any other previously unrecognized signature alg-unsigned the same as any other previously unrecognized signature
algorithm. Non-compliant applications risk vulnerabilities analogous algorithm. Non-compliant applications risk vulnerabilities analogous
to those described in [JWT] and Section 1.1 of to those described in [JWT] and Section 1.1 of [JOSE].
[I-D.ietf-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15].
The signature in a self-signed certificate is self-derived and thus The signature in a self-signed certificate is self-derived and thus
of limited use to convey trust. However, some applications might use of limited use to convey trust. However, some applications might use
it as an integrity check to guard against accidental storage it as an integrity check to guard against accidental storage
corruption, etc. An unsigned certificate does not provide any corruption, etc. An unsigned certificate does not provide any
integrity check. Applications checking self-signature for integrity integrity check. Applications checking self-signature for integrity
SHOULD instead use some other mechanism, such as an external hash SHOULD instead use some other mechanism, such as an external hash
that is verified out of band. that is verified out-of-band.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
6.1. Module Identifier 6.1. Module Identifier
IANA is requested to add the following entry in the "SMI Security for IANA has added the following entry in the "SMI Security for PKIX
PKIX Module Identifier" registry, defined by [RFC7299]: Module Identifier" registry, defined by [RFC7299]:
+=========+=========================+============+ +=========+=========================+===========+
| Decimal | Description | References | | Decimal | Description | Reference |
+=========+=========================+============+ +=========+=========================+===========+
| TBD | id-mod-algUnsigned-2025 | [this-RFC] | | 122 | id-mod-algUnsigned-2025 | RFC 9925 |
+---------+-------------------------+------------+ +---------+-------------------------+-----------+
Table 1 Table 1
6.2. Algorithm 6.2. Algorithm
IANA is requested to add the following entry to the "SMI Security for IANA has added the following entry to the "SMI Security for PKIX
PKIX Algorithms" registry [RFC7299]: Algorithms" registry [RFC7299]:
+=========+=================+============+ +=========+=================+===========+
| Decimal | Description | References | | Decimal | Description | Reference |
+=========+=================+============+ +=========+=================+===========+
| 36 | id-alg-unsigned | [this-RFC] | | 36 | id-alg-unsigned | RFC 9925 |
+---------+-----------------+------------+ +---------+-----------------+-----------+
Table 2 Table 2
6.3. Relative Distinguished Name Attribute 6.3. Relative Distinguished Name Attribute
To allocate id-rdna-unsigned, this document introduces a new PKIX OID To allocate id-rdna-unsigned, this document introduces a new PKIX OID
arc for relative distinguished name attributes: arc for relative distinguished name attributes:
IANA is requested to add the following entry to the "SMI Security for IANA has added the following entry to the "SMI Security for PKIX"
PKIX" registry [RFC7299]: registry [RFC7299]:
+=========+=======================================+============+ +=========+=======================================+===========+
| Decimal | Description | References | | Decimal | Description | Reference |
+=========+=======================================+============+ +=========+=======================================+===========+
| TBD1 | Relative Distinguished Name Attribute | [this-RFC] | | 25 | Relative Distinguished Name Attribute | RFC 9925 |
+---------+---------------------------------------+------------+ +---------+---------------------------------------+-----------+
Table 3 Table 3
IANA is requested to create the "SMI Security for PKIX Relative IANA has created the "SMI Security for PKIX Relative Distinguished
Distinguished Name Attribute" registry within the "Structure of Name Attribute" registry within the "Structure of Management
Management Information (SMI) Numbers (MIB Module Registrations)" Information (SMI) Numbers (MIB Module Registrations)" registry group.
group.
The new registry's description is The new registry's description is
"iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanisms.pkix.rdna "iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanisms.pkix.rdna
(1.3.6.1.5.5.7.TBD1)". (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.25)".
The new registry has three columns and is initialized with the The new registry has three columns and is initialized with the
following values: following values:
+=========+==================+============+ +=========+==================+===========+
| Decimal | Description | References | | Decimal | Description | Reference |
+=========+==================+============+ +=========+==================+===========+
| TBD2 | id-rdna-unsigned | [this-RFC] | | 1 | id-rdna-unsigned | RFC 9925 |
+---------+------------------+------------+ +---------+------------------+-----------+
Table 4 Table 4
Future updates to this table are to be made according to the Future updates to this table are to be made according to the
Specification Required policy as defined in [RFC8126]. Specification Required policy as defined in [RFC8126].
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the [RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5912>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15] [JOSE] Madden, N., "JOSE: Deprecate 'none' and 'RSA1_5'", Work in
Madden, N., "JOSE: Deprecate 'none' and 'RSA1_5'", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-jose-deprecate-none- Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-jose-deprecate-none-
rsa15-02, 2 April 2025, rsa15-03, 19 September 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jose- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-jose-
deprecate-none-rsa15-02>. deprecate-none-rsa15-03>.
[JWT] Sanderson, J., "How Many Days Has It Been Since a JWT [JWT] Sanderson, J., "How Many Days Has It Been Since a JWT
alg:none Vulnerability?", 9 October 2024, alg:none Vulnerability?",
<https://www.howmanydayssinceajwtalgnonevuln.com/>. <https://www.howmanydayssinceajwtalgnonevuln.com/>.
[RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R. [RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R.
Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, Certification Path Building", RFC 4158,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4158, September 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4158, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4158>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4158>.
[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol [RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names", (LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names",
RFC 4514, DOI 10.17487/RFC4514, June 2006, RFC 4514, DOI 10.17487/RFC4514, June 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4514>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4514>.
[RFC5914] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor [RFC5914] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor
Format", RFC 5914, DOI 10.17487/RFC5914, June 2010, Format", RFC 5914, DOI 10.17487/RFC5914, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5914>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5914>.
[RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX [RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX
Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014, Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7299>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[X.509] ITU-T, "Information technology - Open Systems [X.509] ITU-T, "Information technology - Open Systems
Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute
certificate frameworks", ISO/IEC 9594-8:2020 , October certificate frameworks", ITU-T Recommendation X.509, ISO/
2019. IEC 9594-8:2020, October 2019,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/t-rec-x.509/en>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
SignatureAlgorithmNone SignatureAlgorithmNone
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algUnsigned-2025(TBD) } id-mod-algUnsigned-2025(122) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN BEGIN
IMPORTS IMPORTS
SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- in [RFC5912] FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- in [RFC5912]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) } id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
skipping to change at page 11, line 37 skipping to change at line 449
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 36 } mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 36 }
sa-unsigned SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= { sa-unsigned SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-unsigned IDENTIFIER id-alg-unsigned
PARAMS ARE absent PARAMS ARE absent
} }
id-rdna-unsigned OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) id-rdna-unsigned OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) rdna(TBD1) TBD2 } mechanisms(5) pkix(7) rdna(25) 1 }
at-unsigned ATTRIBUTE ::= { at-unsigned ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE UTF8String (SIZE (0)) TYPE UTF8String (SIZE (0))
IDENTIFIED BY id-rdna-unsigned IDENTIFIED BY id-rdna-unsigned
} }
END END
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
 End of changes. 58 change blocks. 
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