rfc9925.original.md		rfc9925.md
	---		---
	title: "Unsigned X.509 Certificates"		title: "Unsigned X.509 Certificates"
			abbrev:
	category: std		category: std
			ipr: trust200902
	docname: draft-ietf-lamps-x509-alg-none-latest		docname: draft-ietf-lamps-x509-alg-none-latest
	submissiontype: IETF # also: "independent", "editorial", "IAB", or "IRTF"		submissiontype: IETF
	number:		number: 9925
	date:		date: 2026-02
	updates: 5280		updates: 5280
	consensus: true		consensus: true
	v: 3		v: 3
	area: "Security"		pi: [toc, symrefs, sortrefs]
	workgroup: "Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME"		lang: en
			area: SEC
			workgroup: lamps
	keyword:		keyword:
	- self-signed certificate		- self-signed certificate
	venue:
	group: "Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME"
	type: "Working Group"
	mail: "spasm@ietf.org"
	arch: "https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/spasm/"
	github: "davidben/x509-alg-none"
	latest: "https://davidben.github.io/x509-alg-none/draft-ietf-lamps-x509-alg-none.ht
	ml"
	author:		author:
	-		-
	ins: "D. Benjamin"		ins: "D. Benjamin"
	name: "David Benjamin"		name: "David Benjamin"
	organization: "Google LLC"		organization: "Google LLC"
	email: davidben@google.com		email: davidben@google.com
	normative:		normative:
	# From the ASN.1 module.		# From the ASN.1 module.
	RFC5912:		RFC5912:
	informative:		informative:
	JWT:		JWT:
	title: How Many Days Has It Been Since a JWT alg:none Vulnerability?		title: How Many Days Has It Been Since a JWT alg:none Vulnerability?
	target: https://www.howmanydayssinceajwtalgnonevuln.com/		target: https://www.howmanydayssinceajwtalgnonevuln.com/
	date: 2024-10-09		date: false
	author:		author:
	-		-
	ins: "J. Sanderson"		ins: "J. Sanderson"
	name: "James 'zofrex' Sanderson"		name: "James 'zofrex' Sanderson"
	X.509:		X.509:
	title: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Pu blic-key and attribute certificate frameworks"		title: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Pu blic-key and attribute certificate frameworks"
			target: https://www.itu.int/rec/t-rec-x.509/en
	date: October 2019		date: October 2019
	author:		author:
	org: ITU-T		org: ITU-T
	seriesinfo:		seriesinfo:
	ISO/IEC 9594-8:2020		ITU-T Recommendation: X.509
			ISO/IEC: 9594-8:2020
			I-D.ietf-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15:
			display: JOSE
	...		...
	--- abstract		--- abstract
	This document defines a placeholder X.509 signature algorithm that may be used		This document defines a placeholder X.509 signature algorithm that may be used
	in contexts where the consumer of the certificate is not expected to verify the		in contexts where the consumer of the certificate is not expected to verify the
	signature. As part of this, it updates RFC 5280.		signature. As part of this, it updates RFC 5280.
	--- middle		--- middle
	skipping to change at line 73 ¶		skipping to change at line 74 ¶
	# Introduction		# Introduction
	An X.509 certificate {{!RFC5280}} relates two entities in the PKI: information		An X.509 certificate {{!RFC5280}} relates two entities in the PKI: information
	about a subject and a proof from an issuer. Viewing the PKI as a graph with		about a subject and a proof from an issuer. Viewing the PKI as a graph with
	entities as nodes, as in {{?RFC4158}}, a certificate is an edge between the		entities as nodes, as in {{?RFC4158}}, a certificate is an edge between the
	subject and issuer.		subject and issuer.
	In some contexts, an application needs standalone subject information instead of		In some contexts, an application needs standalone subject information instead of
	a certificate. In the graph model, the application needs a node, not an edge.		a certificate. In the graph model, the application needs a node, not an edge.
	For example, certification path validation ({{Section 6 of !RFC5280}}) begins at		For example, certification path validation ({{Section 6 of !RFC5280}}) begins at
	a trust anchor, or root certification authority (root CA). The application		a trust anchor or root certification authority (root CA). The application
	trusts this trust anchor information out-of-band and does not require an		trusts this trust anchor information out-of-band and does not require an
	issuer's signature.		issuer's signature.
	X.509 does not define a structure for this scenario. Instead, X.509 trust		X.509 does not define a structure for this scenario. Instead, X.509 trust
	anchors are often represented with "self-signed" certificates, where the		anchors are often represented with "self-signed" certificates, where the
	subject's key signs over itself. Other formats, such as {{?RFC5914}} exist to		subject's key signs over itself. Other formats, such as {{?RFC5914}}, exist to
	convey trust anchors, but self-signed certificates remain widely used.		convey trust anchors, but self-signed certificates remain widely used.
	Additionally, some TLS {{?RFC8446}} server deployments use self-signed		Additionally, some TLS {{?RFC8446}} server deployments use self-signed
	end entity certificates when they do not intend to present a CA-issued		end entity certificates when they do not intend to present a CA-issued
	identity, instead expecting the relying party to authenticate the certificate		identity, instead expecting the relying party to authenticate the certificate
	out-of-band, e.g. via a known fingerprint.		out-of-band, e.g., via a known fingerprint.
	These self-signatures typically have no security value, aren't checked by		These self-signatures typically have no security value, aren't checked by
	the receiver, and only serve as placeholders to meet syntactic requirements of		the receiver, and only serve as placeholders to meet syntactic requirements of
	an X.509 certificate.		an X.509 certificate.
	Computing signatures as placeholders has some drawbacks:		Computing signatures as placeholders has some drawbacks:
	* Post-quantum signature algorithms are large, so including a self-signature		* Post-quantum signature algorithms are large, so including a self-signature
	significantly increases the size of the payload.		significantly increases the size of the payload.
	* If the subject is an end entity, rather than a CA, computing an X.509		* If the subject is an end entity, rather than a CA, computing an X.509
	signature risks cross-protocol attacks with the intended use of the key.		signature risks cross-protocol attacks with the intended use of the key.
	* It is ambiguous whether such a self-signature requires the CA bit in basic		* It is ambiguous whether such a self-signature requires the CA bit in basic
	constraints or keyCertSign in key usage. If the key is intended for a		constraints or keyCertSign in key usage. If the key is intended for a
	non-X.509 use, asserting those capabilities is an unnecessary risk.		non-X.509 use, asserting those capabilities is an unnecessary risk.
	* If the subject is an end entity, and the end entity's key is not a signing		* If the subject is an end entity, and the end entity's key is not a signing
	key (e.g. a KEM key), there is no valid signature algorithm to use with the key.		key (e.g., a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) key), there is no valid signature al gorithm to use with the key.
	This document defines a profile for unsigned X.509 certificates, which may be		This document defines a profile for unsigned X.509 certificates, which may be
	used when the certificate is used as a container for subject information,		used when the certificate is used as a container for subject information,
	without any specific issuer.		without any specific issuer.
	# Conventions and Definitions		# Requirements Language
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",		{::boilerplate bcp14-tagged}
	"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 {{!RFC2119}} {{!RFC8174}}
	when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
	# Constructing Unsigned Certificates		# Constructing Unsigned Certificates
	This section describes how a sender constructs an unsigned certificate.		This section describes how a sender constructs an unsigned certificate.
	## Signature		## Signature
	To construct an unsigned X.509 certificate, the sender MUST set the		To construct an unsigned X.509 certificate, the sender MUST set the
	Certificate's signatureAlgorithm and TBSCertificate's signature fields each to		Certificate's signatureAlgorithm and TBSCertificate's signature fields each to
	an AlgorithmIdentifier with algorithm id-alg-unsigned, defined below:		an AlgorithmIdentifier with algorithm id-alg-unsigned, defined below:
	skipping to change at line 154 ¶		skipping to change at line 152 ¶
	In particular, the following fields describe a certificate's issuer:		In particular, the following fields describe a certificate's issuer:
	* issuer ({{Section 4.1.2.4 of !RFC5280}})		* issuer ({{Section 4.1.2.4 of !RFC5280}})
	* issuerUniqueID ({{Section 4.1.2.8 of !RFC5280}})		* issuerUniqueID ({{Section 4.1.2.8 of !RFC5280}})
	The issuer field is not optional, and both {{X.509}} and		The issuer field is not optional, and both {{X.509}} and
	{{Section 4.1.2.4 of !RFC5280}} forbid empty issuers, so such a value may not be		{{Section 4.1.2.4 of !RFC5280}} forbid empty issuers, so such a value may not be
	interoperable with existing applications.		interoperable with existing applications.
	If the subject is not empty, senders MAY set the issuer to the subject, similar		If the subject is not empty, senders MAY set the issuer to the subject, similar
	how they would construct a self-signed certificate.		to how they would construct a self-signed certificate.
	This may be useful in applications that, for example,		This may be useful in applications that, for example,
	expect trust anchors to have matching issuer and subject. This is, however, a		expect trust anchors to have a matching issuer and subject. This is, however, a
	placeholder value. The unsigned certificate is not considered self-signed or		placeholder value. The unsigned certificate is not considered self-signed or
	self-issued.		self-issued.
			<!--[rfced] For clarity, may we update the latter part of this sentence
			as follows?
			Original:
			Senders MAY alternatively use a short placeholder issuer consisting
			of a single relative distinguished name, with a single attribute of
			type id-rdna-unsigned and value a zero-length UTF8String.
			Perhaps:
			Senders MAY alternatively use a short placeholder issuer consisting
			of a single relative distinguished name that has a single attribute of
			type id-rdna-unsigned and a value with a zero-length UTF8String.
			-->
	Senders MAY alternatively use a short placeholder issuer consisting of a single		Senders MAY alternatively use a short placeholder issuer consisting of a single
	relative distinguished name, with a single attribute of type id-rdna-unsigned		relative distinguished name, with a single attribute of type id-rdna-unsigned
	and value a zero-length UTF8String. id-rdna-unsigned is defined as follows:		and value a zero-length UTF8String. id-rdna-unsigned is defined as follows:
	~~~		~~~
	id-rdna-unsigned OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 3 6 1 5 5 7 TBD1 TBD2}		id-rdna-unsigned OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {1 3 6 1 5 5 7 25 1}
	~~~		~~~
	This placeholder name, in the string representation of {{?RFC4514}}, is:		This placeholder name, in the string representation of {{?RFC4514}}, is:
	~~~		~~~
	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.TBD1.TBD2=#0C00		1.3.6.1.5.5.7.25.1=#0C00
	~~~		~~~
	Senders MUST omit the issuerUniqueID field, as it is optional, not applicable,		Senders MUST omit the issuerUniqueID field, as it is optional, not applicable,
	and already forbidden by {{Section 4.1.2.8 of !RFC5280}}.		and already forbidden by {{Section 4.1.2.8 of !RFC5280}}.
	## Extensions		## Extensions
	Some X.509 extensions also describe the certificate issuer and thus are not		Some X.509 extensions also describe the certificate issuer and thus are not
	meaningful for an unsigned certificate:		meaningful for an unsigned certificate:
	* authority key identifier ({{Section 4.2.1.1 of !RFC5280}})		* authority key identifier ({{Section 4.2.1.1 of !RFC5280}})
	* issuer alternative name ({{Section 4.2.1.7 of !RFC5280}})		* issuer alternative name ({{Section 4.2.1.7 of !RFC5280}})
			<!--[rfced] To improve readability and avoid the repetition of "include" and
			"includes", may we update this sentence as follows?
			Original:
			Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280] requires
			certificates to include the authority key identifier, but includes an
			exception for self-signed certificates used when distributing a
			public key.
			Perhaps:
			Section 4.2.1.1 of [RFC5280] requires
			certificates to include the authority key identifier, but it also describes an
			exception for self-signed certificates used when distributing a
			public key.
			-->
	Senders SHOULD omit the authority key identifier and issuer alternative name		Senders SHOULD omit the authority key identifier and issuer alternative name
	extensions. {{Section 4.2.1.1 of !RFC5280}} requires certificates to include		extensions. {{Section 4.2.1.1 of !RFC5280}} requires certificates to include
	the authority key identifier, but includes an exception for self-signed certificates		the authority key identifier, but includes an exception for self-signed certificates
	used when distributing a public key. This document updates {{!RFC5280}} to also		used when distributing a public key. This document updates {{!RFC5280}} to also
	permit omitting authority key identifier in unsigned certificates.		permit omitting the authority key identifier in unsigned certificates.
	Some extensions reflect whether the subject is a CA or an end entity:		Some extensions reflect whether the subject is a CA or an end entity:
	* key usage ({{Section 4.2.1.3 of !RFC5280}})		* key usage ({{Section 4.2.1.3 of !RFC5280}})
	* basic constraints ({{Section 4.2.1.9 of !RFC5280}})		* basic constraints ({{Section 4.2.1.9 of !RFC5280}})
	Senders SHOULD fill in these values to reflect the subject. That is:		<!--[rfced] FYI - We've reformatted the following text into an unordered
			list. Please review and let us know of any objections.
	If the subject is a CA, it SHOULD assert the keyCertSign key usage bit and		Original:
	SHOULD include a basic constraints extensions that sets the cA boolean to TRUE.		Senders SHOULD fill in these values to reflect the subject. That is:
	If the subject is an end entity, it SHOULD NOT assert the keyCertSign key usage		If the subject is a CA, it SHOULD assert the keyCertSign key usage
	bit, and it SHOULD either omit the basic constraints extension or set the cA		bit and SHOULD include a basic constraints extensions that sets the
	boolean to FALSE. Unlike a self-signed certificate, an unsigned certificate does		cA boolean to TRUE.
	not issue itself, so there is no need to accommodate a self-signature in either
	extension.		If the subject is an end entity, it SHOULD NOT assert the keyCertSign
			key usage bit, and it SHOULD either omit the basic constraints
			extension or set the cA boolean to FALSE. Unlike a self-signed
			certificate, an unsigned certificate does not issue itself, so there
			is no need to accommodate a self-signature in either extension.
			Current:
			Senders SHOULD fill in these values to reflect the subject. That is:
			* If the subject is a CA, it SHOULD assert the keyCertSign key usage
			bit and SHOULD include a basic constraints extension that sets
			the cA boolean to TRUE.
			* If the subject is an end entity, it SHOULD NOT assert the
			keyCertSign key usage bit, and it SHOULD either omit the basic
			constraints extension or set the cA boolean to FALSE. Unlike a
			self-signed certificate, an unsigned certificate does not issue
			itself, so there is no need to accommodate a self-signature in
			either extension.
			-->
			Senders SHOULD fill in these values to reflect the subject. That is:
			* If the subject is a CA, it SHOULD assert the keyCertSign key usage bit and
			SHOULD include a basic constraints extension that sets the cA boolean to TRUE.
			* If the subject is an end entity, it SHOULD NOT assert the keyCertSign key usage
			bit, and it SHOULD either omit the basic constraints extension or set the cA
			boolean to FALSE. Unlike a self-signed certificate, an unsigned certificate does
			not issue itself, so there is no need to accommodate a self-signature in either
			extension.
	# Consuming Unsigned Certificates		# Consuming Unsigned Certificates
	X.509 signatures of type id-alg-unsigned are always invalid:		X.509 signatures of type id-alg-unsigned are always invalid:
	* When processing X.509 certificates without verifying signatures, receivers MAY		* When processing X.509 certificates without verifying signatures, receivers MAY
	accept id-alg-unsigned.		accept id-alg-unsigned.
	* When verifying X.509 signatures, receivers MUST reject id-alg-unsigned.		* When verifying X.509 signatures, receivers MUST reject id-alg-unsigned.
	In particular, X.509 validators MUST NOT accept id-alg-unsigned in the place of		In particular, X.509 validators MUST NOT accept id-alg-unsigned in the place of
	a signature in the certification path.		a signature in the certification path.
	It is expected that most unmodified X.509 applications will already be		It is expected that most unmodified X.509 applications will already be
	compliant with this guidance. X.509 applications are thus RECOMMENDED to satisfy thes e		compliant with this guidance. X.509 applications are thus RECOMMENDED to satisfy thes e
	requirements by ignoring this document, and instead treating id-alg-unsigned as		requirements by ignoring this document and instead treating id-alg-unsigned as
	the same as an unrecognized signature algorithm. An unmodified X.509		the same as an unrecognized signature algorithm. An unmodified X.509
	validator will be unable to verify the signature (Step (a.1) of		validator will be unable to verify the signature (Step (a.1) of
	{{Section 6.1.3 of !RFC5280}}) and thus reject the certification path.		{{Section 6.1.3 of !RFC5280}}) and thus reject the certification path.
	Conversely, in contexts where an X.509 application was ignoring the		Conversely, in contexts where an X.509 application was ignoring the
	self-signature, id-alg-unsigned will also be ignored, but more efficiently.		self-signature, id-alg-unsigned will also be ignored but more efficiently.
	In other contexts, an application may require modifications, or limit itself to		In other contexts, an application may require modifications or limit itself to
	particular forms of unsigned certificate. For example, an application might		particular forms of unsigned certificates. For example, an application might
	check self-signedness to classify locally-configured certificates as trust		check self-signedness to classify locally configured certificates as trust
	anchors or untrusted intermediates. Such an application may need to modify its		anchors or untrusted intermediates. Such an application may need to modify its
	configuration model or user interface before using an unsigned certificate as a		configuration model or user interface before using an unsigned certificate as a
	trust anchor.		trust anchor.
	# Security Considerations		# Security Considerations
	It is best practice to limit cryptographic keys to a single purpose each. If a		It is best practice to limit cryptographic keys to a single purpose each. If a
	key is reused across contexts, applications risk cross-protocol attacks when the		key is reused across contexts, applications risk cross-protocol attacks when the
	two uses collide. However, in applications that use self-signed end entity		two uses collide. However, in applications that use self-signed end entity
	certificates, the subject's key is necessarily used in two ways: the X.509		certificates, the subject's key is necessarily used in two ways: the X.509
	self-signature, and the end entity protocol. Unsigned certificates fix this key		self-signature and the end entity protocol. Unsigned certificates fix this key
	reuse by removing the X.509 self-signature.		reuse by removing the X.509 self-signature.
	If an application accepts id-alg-unsigned as part of a certification path, or		If an application accepts id-alg-unsigned as part of a certification path, or
	in any other context where it is necessary to verify the X.509 signature, the		in any other context where it is necessary to verify the X.509 signature, the
	signature check would be bypassed. Thus, {{consuming-unsigned-certificates}}		signature check would be bypassed. Thus, {{consuming-unsigned-certificates}}
	prohibits this and recommends that applications treat id-alg-unsigned the same		prohibits this and recommends that applications treat id-alg-unsigned the same
	as any other previously unrecognized signature algorithm. Non-compliant		as any other previously unrecognized signature algorithm. Non-compliant
	applications risk vulnerabilities analogous to those described in {{JWT}} and		applications risk vulnerabilities analogous to those described in {{JWT}} and
	{{Section 1.1 of ?I-D.ietf-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15}}.		{{Section 1.1 of ?I-D.ietf-jose-deprecate-none-rsa15}}.
			<!--[rfced] To improve readability, may we update "etc." to "for example"?
			Original:
			However, some applications might use
			it as an integrity check to guard against accidental storage
			corruption, etc.
			Perhaps:
			However, some applications might, for example, use
			it as an integrity check to guard against accidental storage
			corruption.
			-->
	The signature in a self-signed certificate is self-derived and thus of limited		The signature in a self-signed certificate is self-derived and thus of limited
	use to convey trust. However, some applications might use it as an integrity		use to convey trust. However, some applications might use it as an integrity
	check to guard against accidental storage corruption, etc. An unsigned		check to guard against accidental storage corruption, etc. An unsigned
	certificate does not provide any integrity check. Applications checking		certificate does not provide any integrity check. Applications checking
	self-signature for integrity SHOULD instead use some other mechanism, such as an		self-signature for integrity SHOULD instead use some other mechanism, such as an
	external hash that is verified out of band.		external hash that is verified out-of-band.
	# IANA Considerations		# IANA Considerations
	## Module Identifier		## Module Identifier
	IANA is requested to add the following entry in the "SMI Security for PKIX		IANA has added the following entry in the "SMI Security for PKIX
	Module Identifier" registry, defined by {{?RFC7299}}:		Module Identifier" registry, defined by {{?RFC7299}}:
	| Decimal | Description | References |		| Decimal | Description | Reference |
	|---------|-------------------------|------------|		|---------|-------------------------|------------|
	| TBD | id-mod-algUnsigned-2025 | [this-RFC] |		| 122 | id-mod-algUnsigned-2025 | RFC 9925 |
	## Algorithm		## Algorithm
	IANA is requested to add the following entry to the		IANA has added the following entry to the
	"SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms" registry {{?RFC7299}}:		"SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms" registry {{?RFC7299}}:
	| Decimal | Description | References |		| Decimal | Description | Reference |
	|---------|-----------------|------------|		|---------|-----------------|------------|
	| 36 | id-alg-unsigned | [this-RFC] |		| 36 | id-alg-unsigned | RFC 9925 |
	## Relative Distinguished Name Attribute		## Relative Distinguished Name Attribute
	To allocate id-rdna-unsigned, this document introduces a new PKIX OID arc for		To allocate id-rdna-unsigned, this document introduces a new PKIX OID arc for
	relative distinguished name attributes:		relative distinguished name attributes:
	IANA is requested to add the following entry to the "SMI Security for PKIX"		IANA has added the following entry to the "SMI Security for PKIX"
	registry {{?RFC7299}}:		registry {{?RFC7299}}:
	| Decimal | Description | References |		| Decimal | Description | Reference |
	|---------|---------------------------------------|------------|		|---------|---------------------------------------|------------|
	| TBD1 | Relative Distinguished Name Attribute | [this-RFC] |		| 25 | Relative Distinguished Name Attribute | RFC 9925 |
	IANA is requested to create the "SMI Security for PKIX Relative Distinguished		IANA has created the "SMI Security for PKIX Relative Distinguished
	Name Attribute" registry within the "Structure of Management Information (SMI)		Name Attribute" registry within the "Structure of Management Information (SMI)
	Numbers (MIB Module Registrations)" group.		Numbers (MIB Module Registrations)" registry group.
	The new registry's description is		The new registry's description is
	"iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanisms.pkix.rdna (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.TBD1)".		"iso.org.dod.internet.security.mechanisms.pkix.rdna (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.25)".
	The new registry has three columns and is initialized with the following values:		The new registry has three columns and is initialized with the following values:
	| Decimal | Description | References |		| Decimal | Description | Reference |
	|---------|------------------|------------|		|---------|------------------|------------|
	| TBD2 | id-rdna-unsigned | [this-RFC] |		| 1 | id-rdna-unsigned | RFC 9925 |
	Future updates to this table are to be made according to the Specification		Future updates to this table are to be made according to the Specification
	Required policy as defined in {{!RFC8126}}.		Required policy as defined in {{!RFC8126}}.
	--- back		--- back
	# ASN.1 Module		# ASN.1 Module
	~~~		<!--[rfced] We note that [RFC5912] is only cited in the ASN.1 module.
			In order to have a 1:1 matchup between the references section and the text,
			please review the text and let us know where a citation may be included.
			We suggest adding a sentence before the ASN.1 module to cite [RFC5912].
			Perhaps:
			This ASN.1 module uses the conventions established by [RFC5912].
			-->
			~~~ asn.1
	SignatureAlgorithmNone		SignatureAlgorithmNone
	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)		{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)		security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
	id-mod-algUnsigned-2025(TBD) }		id-mod-algUnsigned-2025(122) }
	DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=		DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
	BEGIN		BEGIN
	IMPORTS		IMPORTS
	SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM		SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM
	FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- in [RFC5912]		FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- in [RFC5912]
	{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)		{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
	security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)		security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
	id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }		id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }
	skipping to change at line 344 ¶		skipping to change at line 424 ¶
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)		identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
	mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 36 }		mechanisms(5) pkix(7) alg(6) 36 }
	sa-unsigned SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {		sa-unsigned SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
	IDENTIFIER id-alg-unsigned		IDENTIFIER id-alg-unsigned
	PARAMS ARE absent		PARAMS ARE absent
	}		}
	id-rdna-unsigned OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)		id-rdna-unsigned OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
	identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)		identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
	mechanisms(5) pkix(7) rdna(TBD1) TBD2 }		mechanisms(5) pkix(7) rdna(25) 1 }
	at-unsigned ATTRIBUTE ::= {		at-unsigned ATTRIBUTE ::= {
	TYPE UTF8String (SIZE (0))		TYPE UTF8String (SIZE (0))
	IDENTIFIED BY id-rdna-unsigned		IDENTIFIED BY id-rdna-unsigned
	}		}
	END		END
	~~~		~~~
	# Acknowledgements		# Acknowledgements
	{:numbered="false"}		{:numbered="false"}
	Thanks to Bob Beck, Nick Harper, and Sophie Schmieg for reviewing an early		Thanks to {{{Bob Beck}}}, {{{Nick Harper}}}, and {{{Sophie Schmieg}}} for reviewing a
	iteration of this document. Thanks to Alex Gaynor for providing a link to cite		n early
	for {{JWT}}. Thanks to Russ Housley for additional input.		iteration of this document. Thanks to {{{Alex Gaynor}}} for providing a link to cite
			for {{JWT}}. Thanks to {{{Russ Housley}}} for additional input.
			<!-- [rfced] FYI - We have added an expansion for the following abbreviation
			per Section 3.6 of RFC 7322 ("RFC Style Guide"). Please review each
			expansion in the document carefully to ensure correctness.
			Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM)
			-->
			<!-- [rfced] Please review the "Inclusive Language" portion of the online
			Style Guide <https://www.rfc-editor.org/styleguide/part2/#inclusive_language>
			and let us know if any changes are needed. Updates of this nature typically
			result in more precise language, which is helpful for readers.
			Note that our script did not flag any words in particular, but this should
			still be reviewed as a best practice.
			-->
End of changes. 48 change blocks.
	62 lines changed or deleted		141 lines changed or added
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